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Abstract
This article illustrates the problems and the prospects for a comprehensive durable con-
flict settlement in South Thailand, and how far Indonesia has played its significant role in help-
ing the said conflict settlement process. The fact shows the sources of contemporary conflict in
South Thailand derive not only from the internal environmental factors, but also from the exter-
nal enviromental factors, such as the growing influence of jihadist ideology in the regional and
global arena. The conditions lead to the complexity of conflict issue and then attract the atten-
tion and concern of the international community. Indonesia has so far taken the lead in address-
ing conflict in South Thailand through a mediation approach at both the Track One (state actor)
and Track Two (non-state actor) levels. The 2008 Bogor peace talks and the conflict mediation
measures carried out by NahdlatulUlama and Muhammadiyah in this context are a milestone in
the course of Indonesia’s total diplomacy. Indonesia is challenged to play a more active role in
the quest for durable peace in the Southeast Asian region. Lessons learned from the past media-
tion process are expected to strengthen the Indonesia’s diplomacy in supporting the immediate
settlement of the South Thailand’s conflict.
Abstrak
Artikel ini menjelaskan masalah masalah dan prospek bagi penyelesaian konflik secara
komprehensif dan langgeng di Thailand Selatan, dan bagaimana Indonesia memainkan peranannya
secara signifikan.Fakta menunjukkan bahwa sumber konflik kontemporer diThailand Selatan tidak
hanya berasal dari faktor lingkup internal semata, namun juga berasal dari faktor lingkup eksternal,
seperti perkembanganpengaruh ideologi jihadis di tingkat global dan regional. Faktor-faktor tersebut
membawa kepada kompleksitas persoalan konflik diwilayah inidan selanjutnyamengundang perhatian
dankeprihatinanmasyarakat internasional, khususnya kalangannegara-negaratetangga Thailand. Sejauh
ini Indonesia telah mempeloporiupaya menyikapikonflik di Thailand Selatan melaluipendekatan me-
dia sibaik melalui jalur pemerintah (track one) maupun jalur non-pemerintah (track two). Perundingan
perdamaian Bogor tahun 2008 dan upaya mediasikonflik yang dilakukan oleh Nahdlatul Ulama dan
Muhammadiyah dalamkonteks inimerupakan tonggak sejarah dalam perjalanan diplomasi total Indo-
nesia. Indonesia tertantang memainkanperan lebihaktif lagidalammendukung terwujud nya perdamaian
langgeng di wilayahAsia Tenggara, khususnya di wilayah Thailand Selatan yang dirundung konflik.
Pelajaran yang dari proses mediasi di masa lampau diharapkan memperkokoh diplomasi Indonesia
mendukung penyelesaiankonflik Thailand Selatan.
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Introduction
The twenty first century is a century of a
good hope for the future course of the Southern
Thailand region currentlyentering a new dimen-
sion of its conflict settlement process. During the
period of time the conflict intensity in this region
has been attracting the attention of international
communitycircle, either individualsovereignstates
including ASEAN member countries or interna-
tional organizations, such as the Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC). In this regard, theydo
not stand idle but makeconstructiveefforts to settle
the conflict. And even some come up with alter-
native options, such as the use of the third party’s
mediation. Indeed, the tension in predominantly
Muslim Southern Thailand historically termed
Patani, comprising the current provinces of
Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala, has long been
present, but it turned violent inearlyJanuary2004
when a group of gunmen launched raids on gov-
ernment offices, stormed an army camp in
Narathiwat province and instigated instability. The
situation deteriorated dramatically following the
case of the indiscriminate attack over the historic
Krue-Se mosque on 28 April 2004 by the Thai
military and the TakBai incident during the holy
month of Ramadan on 25 October 2005 which
claimed casualties among the Muslim protestors
mostlycaused byasphyxiation as a result of being
smothered by bodies of other detainees. Follow-
ing the said incidents, the violence in the southern
provinces escalated sharply, both in the number
of incidents and the brutalityof the violence.
The violent tension in the three southern
border provinces, namelyNarathiwat, Pattani and
Yala, has made a profound effect on the morale of
local people. Since then it has also been a subject
of debate as well as a matter ofdeep concern par-
ticularly among theASEAN member countries.
The majorityof the population ofThailand’s three
southernprovinceshasmore affinities toandshares
strongethnic, religious, linguisticand culturalbonds
with the Malaysian people across the border. The
collisionofcivilizationbetween the South’s Malay
Muslims and the Buddhist Thaicame to surface in
line with the efforts by the government to Thaiize
theseMuslimMalaypopulation. Under thenational
integration policy, the government has incessantly
been attempting to integrate the South’s Muslim
populations into a united Thai state. Such a policy
was perceived a process of deculturalization that
subsequentlystimulates armed insurgencybysome
MuslimMalays in Southern Thailand in the 1960s
onwards (Arifi, 2008:6).
As a neighboring country and the world’s
largest Muslim country, Indonesia has been con-
tributing significantlyto the settlement ofthePatani
conflict throughthe mechanismofmediationat the
levels of both first track diplomacy and second
track diplomacy. The diplomatic efforts that have
been carried out by Indonesia in this case are le-
gally correct as clearlymandated in the Preamble
of the 1945 Constitution. Such kind of diplomacy
is benefited from the experiences of Indonesia in
the field ofconflict resolution with its long series of
negotiations, domesticallyand regionally, such as
the settlement of the domestic conflicts in Poso
and Ambon, Aceh peace process, and Moro
Peace Talks. All these provide Indonesia’s diplo-
macywith a distinctive leverage to playa role as a
bridge builder or a mediator in support of a con-
flict termination.
To certain extent, Indonesia’s role inmain-
taining world order and peace seems less effec-
tive due to certain reasons as clearly reflected in
the Patani conflict settlement measures. Despite
its complex nature, the Patani conflict settlement,
indeed, relies heavilyon the good willof the Thai
government in this case. However, the prospect
for effectivePatani conflict settlement is still open;
particularlyif the approaches to accommodate the
interest of the two hostile parties in this context
are no longer relying on a business as usual (con-
ventional) approach but a business unusual (un-
conventional) one. Bythespirit oflearning for good
things and mistakes, the peace settlement process
should also be emphasizing the past experience
for a more constructive result in the future.
TheoreticalApproaches
In order to analyze how far Indonesia’s
diplomacy in addressing the question of the long
standing SouthThailand conflict, there are at least
two relevant theories that can be properly used in
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this context, namely the theory of conflict man-
agement and that of diplomacy (first track, sec-
ond track and multi-track). Theoreticallyconflict
management is a combination of three relevant el-
ements, namely prevention, containment and ter-
mination (Alagappa, 1995:369). Alagappa main-
tains that conflict Prevention is a part of the con-
flict management aiming to prevent a situation of
conflict fromhappening or at least to ensure that
no violent conflict occurs. In this regard, it pro-
vides a valuable contribution to dampening a de-
gree ofconflict to a point where no use offorce is
taken. Conflict containment refers to a situation
of self restraint in the use of force with the pur-
pose of denying victory to the aggressor as well
as simultaneously preventing the spread of con-
flict, whichcould enmeshother actors towards the
escalation of violence. Conflict termination is a
process to end a conflict by involving two hostile
parties for desired conflict settlement and resolu-
tion (Mitchell, 1989: 275-277). In essence, the
term‘settlement’ is slightlydifferent fromthe term
‘resolution’. Settlement refers for a particular con-
ditionwhichleads violent hostilities toanend, while
resolution goes much further than that. It aims to
eliminate or eradicate the verysources of conflict,
and transformthe attitude and behavior of the con-
flicting parties.
Meanwhile, Butler maintains that conflict
management is best understood as any attempt,
typically involving the third party, incontrolling a
certain situation of conflict between politically
motivated actors at the levels of the state or sub-
state. Conflict management aims to mitigate the
damaging impact of the ongoing conflicts. In cer-
tainextent, conflict management originates from a
concern the part of a third partybycontaining the
conflict’s damaging and destabilizing effects to the
parties involved (semi-involved or non-involved
parties) aswellas containing the violent escalation
of the conflict per se. Conflict management ap-
proaches come up when the prospects for con-
flict resolution seem dim, while the dynamics of
the conflict is marked by the tide of escalation that
needs an immediate response. The approaches
towards managing a conflict, based on this theory,
are divided into four categories, namely threat-
based, deterrence-based, adjudicatory, and
accommodationists. Threat-based category in-
cludes the use and/or threat of force and other
tools to compel other parties, and thus it corre-
sponds most clearly with the threat and/or use of
‘hard’ (coercive) power in the pursuit of interest.
Deterrence-based category includes the use and/
or threat of force, and the various instruments of
coercive diplomacy to deter other parties. Like
the threat-based one, this categoryalso addresses
the use of hard power by the parties concerned in
struggle of their interest. Adjudicatory category
includes legal, extra-legal, and normative institu-
tions and approaches to craft and reach legal set-
tlements with other parties. This categoryempha-
sizes the significance of recognition of and an ap-
peal to a system of norms, rights and legalities.
Accommodationists categoryincludes traditional
and non-traditional diplomatic means to broker
agreement withother parties. Thus, it puts an em-
phasis on the use of soft (persuasive) power in
pursuit of any interest. The said approaches car-
ries with its different ramifications and conse-
quences, entails different cost, demands different
resources, and may succeed (or fail) under differ-
ent circumstances (Butler, 2009:13-14).
Along with the aforementioned theory,
analyzing the issue of the South Thailand settle-
ment also relies on the diplomacytheoryapproach
certainly. Theessence ofdiplomacyisgrouped into
four theoretical classifications. Firstly, diplomacy
is the conduct of relations between sovereign
states through the medium of officials based at
home or abroad. Secondly, diplomacyis an art of
using tact and skill indealing withpeople. Thirdly,
diplomacy is an attempt to address a conflict (in-
ter or intra-state conflicts). Fourthly, diplomacy
is a synonym for foreign policy (Berridge and
James, 2003: 69-70).
Diplomacywhich is anessentiallypolitical
activityand, well resourced and skilful, and a ma-
jor ingredient of power, functions as a channel of
communication of sovereign countries in pursuit
of its objectives of their foreign policies. In this
sense, its function is clearly reflected particularly
in the communication process between officials
designed to promote foreign policyeither by for-
malagreement or tacit adjustment; and also in the
discrete activities such as gathering information,
clarifying intentions, and engendering goodwill
(Berridge, 2005: 1). In its recent development,
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diplomacy is no longer a monopoly of a state as
the sole actor (track one). Diplomacy which is
carried out by the non-state actor (track two) in
this regard is quite common as well, the so-called
citizen diplomacy. In certain cases, first track and
second trackdiplomacymaybe inpartnership with
eachother, calleda twin-track diplomacy(Berridge
and James,2005:260).
The role of diplomacy as a channel of ef-
fective communication between the conflicting
parties is so important, although incertain cases it
involves the third parties with its intermediaryfunc-
tion (a twin track) to work with the disputants to
resolve the conflict or transform it to make it less
destructive.The third parties in this regard could
come fromthe officialor formal intermediaries cir-
cle, professionalmediators, arbitrators, judges, as
well as the non governmental circle such as reli-
gious institutions, academics, former government
officials, non-governmentalorganizations, civilso-
ciety organizations, and thin tank. In some cases,
however, governments or government officials can
act as informal intermediaries when theyfacilitate
discussions amongnon-officials-private citizens or
groups of individuals-from conflicting parties
(Chigas, 2003:1).
Inadditionto the termtrackone, track two
and twin-track diplomacyas mentioned earlier, the
term ‘track three diplomacy’ is also known par-
ticularlyamong the diplomatic practitioners. This
kind of diplomacy deals with the mechanism of
the unofficial interventions at the grass root level.
It involves unofficial third parties working with
people from all walks of life and sectors of their
society to find ways to promote peace in settings
of violent conflict. It aims to build or rebuild bro-
kenrelationshipsacross the lines ofdivisionamong
ordinarycitizens in communities in a range of sec-
tors. The conduct of the track three diplomacy is
based on the premise that peace is most likely to
be built from the bottom up as well as from the
top down particularly at the grass-root level that
is potentially a microcosm of the larger conflict
(Chigas, 2003: 4).
Methodology
This research paper uses a particular meth-
odological approach insupporting the arguments
on the issueconcerned. It relies heavilyon the data
collectionmostlyobtained fromthe libraryresearch
database and other supporting materials such as
text books and periodicals, such as journals,
magazines and newspapers.
This paper employs a descriptive method
of analysis in elucidating a data-based analytical
argument with the special emphasis on the role of
Indonesia’s diplomacy in carrying out an interme-
diarymissioninSouthThailand conflict settlement.
More specifically, understanding the third party’s
role, in this case Indonesia’s diplomacy role, in
mediating theunceasing intra-state conflict inSouth
Thailand also uses a specific toolof analysis with
its relevant conflict variables-based issue identifi-
cation.
The time frame of the discussion in this
paper is deliberately concentrating on the South
Thailand conflict settlement process that began in
the year 2004 onwards. The choice of the year
2004 onwards as the time frame of the study is
simply based on the fact that the year 2004 on-
wards eyes the growing role ofIndonesia’s diplo-
macyinaddressingsecuritychallenges inthesouth-
ern territory of Thailand following the repressive
policyadopted by the Thaigovernment aiming to
keep the localsituationcalmandconducive as well
as remain under control.
The Question of Patani
Patani, a term used to refer a region in
SouthernThailand, is located along theborder with
Malaysia. The annexationbyThailand in1902 the
Patani includes the present provincialareasofYala,
Narathiwat and Pattaniwhich are mainly popu-
lated by MuslimMalays. Historically, the annexa-
tion of Patani by the Reign of Siam in 1902 was
subsequentlyfollowedbyusing this areaas a buffer
zone against the British Malaya. The annexation
was strengthened in 1909 by anAnglo-Siamese
treaty that drew border lines between Patani and
the Malay states of Kelantan, Perak, Kedah and
Perlis. Under the Siamese reign, the assimilation
policybegan to introduce. The introductionof the
assimilation policy or Pan Thai policy was a mile-
stonetowardsdemolishingthetraditionallocalstruc-
tures and opportunities which then incited strong
resistance bythe localpeople (Valsesia, 2007: 2).
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Take the case of the 1921 Compulsory
PrimaryEducationAct which obliged all children
to enter public primary school. Apart from the
centralization policy, theAct was perceived by the
local Muslim leaders a part of hidden agenda to
transform local cultural and religious values into
Thai values as well as to supplant the
Pondokswhich were often branded a breading
ground ofIslamic revivalism and the PataniMus-
limMalay resistance.or Islamic boarding schools.
Such a thing was perceived by the local Muslim
Malays adegrading or destructionof their cultural
and religious identity. Inaddition, sending children
in Thaipublic schools with their secular teaching
modelwould remove their religious grounding and
the religious leaders, including the Tok Gurus
would lose their influential control over the com-
munity (Li, 2008: 1). Until the introduction of the
1944 Patronage of IslamAct, the other negative
profound impact of the Pan Thaipolicyon the life
of the localpeople was also reflected by very few
opportunities inalmost allareas ofsocial life faced
by the local MuslimMalays. During this period of
time, to some extent the Siamruler discriminated
against the South’s Muslimminorityas clearly re-
flected in the policy of banning them to serve as
public servants, prohibiting them to wear a tradi-
tionalMuslimMalayclothes, andencouraging them
to use Thai names.
Under thePatronage of IslamAct in 1944,
the then Prime Minister PridiPhanomyong at-
tempted to win the heart of the Muslim Malay
community byplacing the Muslim leaders in the
state structures as advisors to the King of Siamon
the Pataniand Islamic matters. The policy to em-
brace the local Muslim Malays was, in fact, less
effective since it failed to curb the establishment of
Muslim resistance movements such as the Patani
People’s Movement (PPM) whichwas established
by Haji Sulong in the second part of the 1940s.
The PPM struggled for the political and cultural
rights ofthe Patanisocietyincluding the implemen-
tation of Islamic law in the said southern prov-
incesbyorganizingnumerousdemonstrations. Until
the 1970s the situation in southernThaiprovinces
became more strained along with more violent
actions staged by the local MuslimMalays move-
ments and the military counterblow launched by
the Thaiauthorities.
The PremTinasulanond’s rise to power in
1980 brought a more promising atmosphere par-
ticularly for the alreadyconflicting area of Patani.
With his new strategy called “Thai Rom Yen”
(peace in the south), the PremTinasulanond ad-
ministration encouraged the participation of the
south’s MuslimMalaysocietyamong other things
inpolitical life. Inaddition, PremTinasulanond also
showed them a lot of attention by the economic
development of the southern Thaiprovinces pro-
gram and the granting of broad amnesty to those
being charged withsubversive activities against the
legitimate government. The other valuable contri-
bution of the PremTinasulanond administration to
bring peace in the Patani area included the estab-
lishment of Civil-Police-Military Taskforce 43
(CPM 43) and Southern Border Provinces Ad-
ministrative Centre (SBPAC). Until the 1997 fi-
nancial crisis era the PremTinasulanond’s policy
led the situation in the southern provinces to be
more conducive, among other things, marked by
the dramatic decrease of the local conflict inten-
sity.The situation changeddramatically soonafter
ThaksinShinawatra was elected as Thailand’s
Prime Minister in 2001. Apart from his contro-
versialdecision to dismantle the important institu-
tions like CPM 43 and SBPAC, ThaksinShina-
watra downgraded the status level of the local
conflict fromthe status levelofseparatismoriented
conflict to that ofnonseparatismoriented conflict.
The latter refers to a merehomeland securitythreat
caused by other reasons such as banditry and in-
cident deliberatelycreatedbythe unscrupulous lo-
cal politicians (Valsesia, 2007: 2-4).
Indeed, the grievances among the South’s
MalayMuslims that have given rise to the conflict
are entirely local. The ongoing security instability
in Southern Thailand, in large part, is related to
the historically-rooted structuralfactors. The ques-
tions ofeducation, employment in thepublic serv-
ice, relative economic deprivation, limited politi-
cal integration, and struggle for the maintenance
of ethnic-religious identity have so far been per-
ceived as the main source of the contemporary
violence. These factors have also been leading the
PataniMuslimMalays to the so long marginalized,
impoverished and brutalized situation. The intro-
ductionofsecular policies bythe Thaigovernment
in the southern region as a part of a half century
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assimilationist policypackage and the growing in-
fluence of violent Jihadist ideology in the region
and around the world have certainlysome effect
in this case (Melvin, 2007: 3).
The fact shows that some Patani Malays
areknownto have fought inAfghanistan, that some
have been trained overseas in Jihadist guerilla
warfare, and that people in the region have links
with Islamist movements elsewhere in the world.
To some extent, the source of the violence in the
southernThaiprovinces might be an identitycrisis
among the locals resulting fromthe obliteration of
PataniMalayidentityover the last century, the re-
sistance against the Pan Thai policy, and socio-
politicaldiscriminationandoppression, which leads
to the inability to find acceptance in the Thailand’s
socio-politicalmainstream, as wellas the presence
of radical Islamic values to fill the void, particu-
larly among the young men. Empirically decul-
turalization contributes significantlyto the turn to
extremismor radicalismamong some young Mus-
lim. Suchas phenomenon, albeit caused bydiffer-
ent factors, maybe partly responsible for the radi-
calism in SouthernThailand (Jory, 2006: 43).
During his time in office, Prime Minister
ThaksinShinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai Party
created a populist program-based extensive sup-
port network throughout the country, including in
the Deep South, and staged a frontal assault on
the legitimacyof the palace. In addition of the in-
ternal rivalry, ThaksinShinawatra’s governmental
policies and conflict mismanagement had also
fuelled the violence particularly in the deep South.
Repressive state actions to curb the violence were
not so effectiveat all, and converselyit led to moral
legitimacyfor a violent struggle among the South’s
Malay Muslim militants and radicalized Islamist
movements McCargo, 2009: 9-12). All these
made the ThaksinShinawatra administration lose
controlof the situation, particularlyalongwith the
growing split betweenThaksinShinawatra and the
military in 2006 about how to prosecute the on-
going violent struggleinsouthernThailand Melvin,
op.cit.: 2). This culminated in a military coup
staged byroyalist officers led by the first Muslim
army commander-in-chief General Sonthi-
Boonyaratkalin on 19 September 2006
(McCargo, op.cit.: 8). General SonthiBoonya-
ratkalin and his military colleagues were widely
seen as having a better understanding and experi-
ence of the Southern Thai provinces than Thak-
sinShinawatra and appear to favor a softer ap-
proach to the crisis that ThaksinShinawatra who
was often criticized both at home and abroad for
his toughapproach to fighting the insurgents (BBC
News: 2006).
The optimism for a possible resolution to
the conflict in the southern region in the post-
ThaksinShinawatra era was beyond expectation.
The violence in this area has significantlyescalated
marked bythe increasing number ofcasualties and
the brutalityof the intensified attacks by the local
militants. Anynew approaches taken by the Thai
authorities to end conflict in the deep South is still
unsettled until this moment, and conversely the
nature ofconflict has beengrowingmore pressing
from time to time (Melvin, op.cit.: 2-3). Such a
fact is certainly a challenge to the neighboring
states, includingIndonesia to playapro-active role
and grasp every opportunity towards a new con-
ciliatory approach-based conflict settlement in
SouthernThailand.
Indonesia’s ‘Peace Maker‘ Role
In accordance with the preamble of the
1945 Constitution, it clearly mentions that “Sub-
sequent thereto, to form a government of the
state of Indonesia which shall protect all the
people of Indonesia and their entire native land,
and in order to improve the public welfare, to
advance the intellectual life of the people and
to contribute to the establishment of a world
order based on freedom, abiding peace and
social justice.” To implement this Constitution
mandate, Indonesia implements an independent
and active foreign policy in pursuit of its national
interest at the regional and global intercourses.
Based on this kind of basic principles, Indonesia’s
independent andactive foreign policy isnot a neu-
tral and passive in character. However, Indonesia
remains committed to consistentlyvoice and par-
ticipate actively inmaintaining world order.
As aregionalpower in theSoutheastAsian
region and the current chairman ofASEAN, In-
donesia is certainly on the right position to take
the lead in addressing common challenges being
faced by the countries in the region through the
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regional conflict management framework which
includes, among other things, the conflict media-
tion mechanism. In the case ofconflict settlement
process in SouthernThailand, for example, Indo-
nesia had so far attempted to playanactive role in
addressing an incessant conflict situation in the re-
gion not only at the multilateral level such as
ASEAN and the Organization of Islamic Confer-
ence (OIC), but also at the bilateral level through
the mechanism of mediation approaches. In this
regard, the mediation role played by Indonesia
included Track One-based mediation and Track
Two-based mediation. On the Track One media-
tion basis, Indonesia participated activelyin spon-
soring peace talks process between the hostile
actors of the Patani conflict in Bogor, while the
Track Two mediation basis was clearly reflected,
at the Thaigovernment’s request, by the involve-
ment of the two prominent CivilSocietyOrgani-
zations (CSOs), Nahdlatul Ulama and Muham-
madiyah, to help bridge the communication gap
between the Centre and the South towards an
immediate conflict settlement in the SouthernThai
provinces.
On the Track One level, in September
2008 Indonesia mediatedpeace talks between the
Thaigovernment and representatives of the Mus-
lim community in Southern Thailand, although it
did not end in anyresult. The talks that took place
inBogor PresidentialPalace and included the then
Vice President JusufKalla and IndonesianAmbas-
sador to Thailand M. Hatta concluded with the
commitment toendyearsofconflict that hadclaims
manycasualties at both sides. Inprinciple the two
sides agreed that the settlement should be con-
ducted peacefully through dialogue forum and
should be in line with theConstitutionofThailand.
During the talks, the Thai government sent five
negotiators, headed by General Khwanchart-
Klahan, the Supreme Commander of the South-
ern Border Provinces Peace Building Command
(SBPPC) which oversees the country’s southern
provinces. The country’s southernMalayMuslims
were represented by leaders of the PattaniMalay
Consultative Congress (PMCC), an umbrella or-
ganization of insurgent groups in Southern Thai-
land. Demands byThai Muslims include, among
other things, the introduction of Islamic law and
making ethnicPattaniMalay(Yawi) aworking lan-
guage in the region, as wellas the improvement of
the local economy and education system. Previ-
ous negotiations, including that sponsored by the
Malaysiangovernment, failedto halt violencewithin
the three provinces, because of a lack of trust be-
tween theparties, as well as theThaigovernment’s
failure to identify which groups or individuals it
should talk to. The Bogor peace talks should be
continued by another second round of negotia-
tions on 1 November 2010 at the same place, but
it failed to realize for certain reasons (The Jakarta
Post, 2008: 1) .
Indeed, the Government of Thailand did
not recognize the legitimacy of the Bogor peace
talks.Asofficially stated by theThaiForeign Min-
istry’s spokespersonTharitCharungvat on22 Sep-
tember 2010, theGovernment ofThailandstrongly
denied the charges against its involvement in the
said peace talks. Thailand notified that she did not
ask Indonesia to serve as a mediator for the Patani
conflict settlement as well (Kompas, 2008: 15).
In other words, the Thai government refused to
be associated with the negotiations which were
sponsored by the thenVice President JusufKalla,
who is credited with helping end three decades of
separatist violence inAceh in 2005.
Such a fact is a test case as well as a chal-
lenge to Indonesia to playa more active role in the
efforts to maintain regional security and stability.
Indonesia has incessantlykept her commitment to
playanactive role insupportinganyregionalpeace
process, including the peace process in the South-
ernThaiprovinces.Therefore, Indonesia welcomes
anyThai government’s request for assistance, but
insisted she would not make anypre-emptive in-
terference. Moreover, Indonesia had past experi-
ence in playing a successful role as a third-party
facilitator between Manila and the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) under the Organization
of Islamic Conference (OIC) forum in the early
1990s. The said peace talks aimed to find solu-
tions to conflicts in the SouthernPhilippines. Until
today, Indonesia has also been taking part actively
in helping implement the 1996 PeaceAgreement
under the auspices of the Organization of the Is-
lamic Conference (OIC) (Sukma, 2010: 3).
The Bogor meeting was arranged follow-
ing a visit by the then Thai Prime Minister
SamakSundaravej to Jakarta early2008.After his
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visit, the Thaicabinet agreed in June to study the
peace process inIndonesia’s once-rebelliousAceh
province as a model for resolving the conflict in
southern Thailand. As notified by Presidential
Spokesman Dino Patti Djalal, President
SoesiloBambangYudhoyono assigned the then
Vice President JusufKalla to mediate the peace
talks soon after the President met delegations of
both sides. With regard to the Aceh peace for-
mula, It might be difficult for the Thaigovernment
to use theAceh lesson as a model, since both have
some differences incertainextent. The differences
rest on some high-principled things, such as the
legitimacy of the representative of the South’s
Malay Muslims, including those representing the
insurgent groups. In the case of the Ace peace
talks, for instance, the Indonesian government
knew that the leaders of the Free Aceh Move-
ment with whomit was dealing were in dailycon-
tact with the rebel commanders in the field (Asso-
ciated Press, 2008).
If accurately observed, Thailand seems
somewhat reluctant to accept any kind of media-
tionasfrequentlyofferedbythethirdpartyincluding
by ASEAN member countries in resolving the
conflict in South Thailand. The attitude of Thai-
land in this case is totally different if compared to
the Philippines and Indonesia which are so open
to anykind of assistance in the conflict settlement
framework. Indonesia has so far been attempting
to coax the Thai government into receiving the
presence of the third party in helping mediate the
conflicting parties in the Southern Thaiprovinces,
particularly the offer coming fromASEAN mem-
ber countries circle. The efforts made by Indone-
sia and ASEAN in this case have so far failed to
get apositive response fromthe Thaigovernment.
The attitude of Thailand that remains in firmposi-
tion to opposing to any kind of foreign interven-
tion in its domestic affairs could be affected byher
historicalprideas a sovereignnationthat had never
been occupied byanyforeign country (Wirajuda:
2010).
As Ambassador IsornPocmontri of the
Thai Foreign Ministrymentioned clearly that the
Patani issue is a domestic problemand the move
towards internationalizing this issue is beyond the
policyor officialposition adopted bythe Thaigov-
ernment. Thailand considers that things would get
more complicated if a foreign intervention was
present. Nevertheless, thegovernment ofThailand
as Prime MinisterAbhisitVejjajiva mentioned that
Thai government muchappreciated all construc-
tive measures takenby the neighboring countries,
including Indonesia, in the efforts to bring peace in
the alreadyconflicting area of Southern Thailand.
It is fullyaware that the situation anywhere in the
region with violence, including in the Southern
Thailand, has a negative profound impact on the
stability of the whole region andASEAN as well
(The Jakarta Post, 2010: 9).
On the Track Two level, the settlement of
the Patani conflict had so far been involving non
state actor circle as well, such as Malaysia’s Ma-
hathir Muhamad Peace Foundation and Indone-
sia’s CivilSocietyOrganizations (CSOs), namely
NahdlatulUlama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Les-
sons learned fromthe Mahathir Muhamad’s me-
diation process clearly showed that the three
rounds of peace talks between senior Thai mili-
tary officers and exiled leaders of the older insur-
gency groups brokered including PULO on the
Malaysian island Langkawiduring 2005, in fact,
fullydepended on the situation on the ground and
on the good willof the Thai government. Indeed,
the talks resulted in some constructive commit-
ments suchas a joint peace and development plan
for the South that rejected the idea of independ-
ence (or even autonomy) but called for an am-
nesty for exiled leaders, the restoration of the
SBPAC and the introduction of the Malay lan-
guage inschools.This initiative, however,hadmini-
mal impact on the ground due to the exiled lead-
ers’ little influence over the new generation of in-
surgents and the Thai government’s attitude that
ignored the recommendations made during the
talks (Storey, 2007:2).
It is understandable that the measures to-
wards opening a productive dialogue with the
Patani insurgents for the South’s durable peace is
impeded bysome crucial factors, suchas the struc-
ture of the insurgency (Melvin, 2007: 38). Unlike
theAceh insurgencygroup ‘FreeAcehMovement’
or ‘GerakanAceh Merdeka (GAM)’whose or-
ganizational structure is clear and command line-
based, there is no such clear and command line-
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based organizationalstructureofSouthThailand’s
insurgent group which represents the interest of
the diverse range of the local insurgent factions. It
remains a real challenge to determining who is le-
gitimately representing and voicing the common
interest of the South’s insurgent groups during the
negotiations as happened during the 2008 Bogor
peace talks.
In the context of the role played by Indo-
nesian CSOs, NU and Muhammadiyah, in medi-
ating conflict in the southern Thai provinces, it
yielded a relatively concrete thing and paved the
wayfor both hostile sides to build up mutual trust
andmutualunderstandingbetweenthem.Although
their Patani missions were no more than a just
moral obligation, the presence of NU and Mu-
hammadiyahwith its MalayMuslimapproaches is
so important, particularlyinbridging thedifferences
and cleavages between the Center and the South
towards an effectivenational reconciliationas well
as improving the alreadyconflicting situationin the
southern region (NU Online, 2008). Moreover,
the southern conflicts result frommisunderstand-
ing and suspicionand have nothing to do with re-
ligion. Only a certain group of people with bad
intentions use religion as a political tool and dis-
torted Islamic teachings.
The Thaigovernmenthas unceasinglytried
to win the heart of the south’s Malay Muslims.
During the ThaksinShinawatra administration, for
example, some fundamentalpolicies were taken
by the Thai government to accommodate the in-
terest of the locals, among other things, by estab-
lishing an Islamic Bank, setting up new Islamic
universities and educational institutions in coop-
eration with leading academic institutions such as
Cairo University, allocating the Hajj pilgrimage’s
special funds for needyMuslim Thais, and boost-
ing the South’sdevelopment growthwith purpose
of raising the standard of living of Muslim Thais.
Inaddition, theThaigovernment also empowered
the 48 member NationalReconciliation Commis-
sion (NRC) for helping ease southernproblems in
order to create reconciliation and bring peace in
the area (Inside Thailand Review, 2008:1-3).
Such policies, however, were not too ef-
fective to curbthe insurgency in the deep South as
reflected by the ongoing escalation of dissension
and the growing distrust and dissatisfaction with
the Center in this area. Thus, open warfare be-
tween the Center and the South detonated by the
failed national integrationdue to the incompatibil-
ity of the two languages-cultures (Buddhist Thai
and Muslim Malay) will never cease to threaten
the life of the Muslim people in the southern re-
gion as well as national integrity, economic stabil-
ityand nationalsecurity (Walker, 2005:115-116).
Learning fromthe aforementioned Indo-
nesia’s Track One and Track Two experiences, it
is clear that an effective mediationprocess should
address commonissues faced by bothhostile par-
ties inthis countrysuchas the ethno-nationalgriev-
ance rather than any sensitive issues that become
their concern. Such sensitive issues, suchas a de-
mand for wide-range autonomyin the three south-
ern border provinces and the internationalization
of the Pataniissue, willmake the talks fail to make
much headway. Thus, a logicaloption for placing
the South’s MalayMuslims in theThai socio-cul-
turalmainstreamreallymakes sense instead of the
struggle for greater autonomythat risks strong re-
jection fromthe Thai government. With no such
conflict resolution, the southern region willbe al-
ways torn by distrust and durable peace remains
a distant prospect.
Withregard to the conflict settlement meas-
ure in Southern Thailand, Indonesia has broader
chance to continue playing more proactive inseek-
ing a peaceful solution between the Thai govern-
ment and the South’s Malay Muslim community,
particularly through a mechanism of the Track
Two-based conflict mediation approach. In this
context, conflict mediationas played bynon-state
actors likeNU and Muhammadiyah isa suggested
model to adopt since it proved acceptable to both
sides, the Center and the South. In such a situa-
tion, the role of the government is still crucial al-
though it is behind the scenes. This is because an
effective mediation performedbythe non-state ac-
tors, including from the CSO circle like NU and
Muhammadiyah, has needof the government’s full
support to make the said mediation process pos-
sible.
Tool ofAnalysis
Inorder to ascertain the questionof Patani
in a broader perspective, there are some tools of
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analysis to relyon, among other things, the Causal
Loop Diagram (CLD). As a part of the systems
thinking, the use of CLD aims to understand the
conflict determinant variables and the causal rela-
tionship between the variables. Of these variables,
the prime variables, the so called ‘leverage’, are
easily known. As a ‘leverage variable’, it consti-
tutes a principal variable of a particular issue to
deal with. The yardstick in identifying the ‘lever-
age’ variables relies on the weight ofeach variable
based on the number of loop and the length of
loop. The more the number of loop and its length
of loop a variable owns, the more significant the
variable will be (Kajian Paradigma Modul 1 A-
2, 2010: 91-102).
In the case of Southern Thailand’s con-
flict, it is identified a number of variables having a
profound impact on the future course of the con-
flict settlement per se. These include Pan-Thai
policy, Thaieducationalsystem, job opportunity,
socio-economic injustice, Thai‘extractive’ authori-
ties, Patani’s public distrust, Patani Muslim cler-
ics’ influence, Islamic radicalism, Islamic fanatisicm,
deculturalization, religious tolerance, Patani’s
diaspora influence, socio-cultural discrimination,
and homeland security. All these, to some extent,
are considered relevant variables to the escalation
ofconflict inthe SouthernThailand in the past few
decades.
Based on the CLD-based analysis as de-
scribed above, it shows that the Pan-Thai policy,
popularlycalled ‘a assimilationist policy’, is a prin-
cipal leverage with the 56 loops, then followed by
thevariableofPatani’s publicdistrust with40 loops
on the second principal leverage. It means that the
measures toward resolving conflict in Southern
Thailand is highly recommended to address and
put an emphasis on at least the two principalvari-
ables. With special emphasis on the said principal
variables, it makes the conflict mediation process
carried out by the third party, such as NU and
Muhammadiyah, more effective. The role of the
third party in this regard is vitally important, par-
ticularly in its position as a bridge builder in order
to finda commonground for negotiations between
the Center and the South towards a truly national
reconciliation and durable peace on the Southern
Thaiprovinces.
Conclusion
Conflict in SouthernThailand is relatively
complex in nature, encompassing almost all kinds
of issues including the most sensitive one dealing
with religious practices. The obstacles to seeking
a peaceful solution over the conflict in Southern
Thailand, among other things, are caused by the
stubborn attitude of both sides. Theyhave so far
been stuck on their basic principles and position
on the issue concerned. For the Thaigovernment,
for example, it takes the stance that the question
of Patani is a domestic problem of Thailand, al-
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though it fails lucidly to analyze situation on the
ground and follow an appropriate strategy to
tackle the unceasing conflict situation in the south-
ern region. The Thai authorities that lack under-
standing of the roots of the problems and Thai
Muslims’ ways oflife have increasinglyaggravated
the alreadyconflicting situation. This leads subse-
quently to the growing concern among the inter-
nationalcommunityparticularlythe Muslimworld
and neighboring countries.
As a neighboring country and the largest
Muslim nation in the world, Indonesia has con-
tributed significantly to the conflict settlement in
SouthernThailand. Suchacontribution is reflected
in the active participation of Indonesia in support-
ingapeacefulsolutioninSouthernThailand through
the Track One and Track Two-based mediation
mechanisms. Indonesia’s contribution evidently
mirrored in the Bogor peace talks and the conflict
mediation performed by NahdlatulUlama (NU)
and Muhammadiyah is a fact. However, all these
measures seemless effective and need further ac-
tion that is more appropriate, including by the in-
volvement of the third party-sponsored mediation,
in addressing the questions on the ground.
In the efforts to supporting the effective
conflict resolution inSouthern Thailand, the con-
flict resolutionformula should be focusing the stra-
tegic issues as clearly formulated in the five sound
policy recommendations as follows.
(1) Indonesia, as a ‘big brother’country
in the region, should playa more active role in the
effort to consistently help maintain peace and or-
der in the region, including the measures towards
a comprehensive conflict settlement in Southern
Thailand; (2) Indonesia is highly recommended to
rely on the Track Two (non-state actors) mecha-
nism to fill the void caused by the absence of the
mediationat the Government-to-Governmentlevel
(Track One) and avoid the impression that Indo-
nesia is interfering withThailand’s domestic issue.
The role of the Indonesian government is to em-
power and support the non-state actors, in this
regard NU and Muhammadiyah, in order to con-
tinue their peace agenda to help end conflict in
Southern Thailand through the mediation mecha-
nism;(3)Indonesia should come upwithmorecon-
structive options for creating durable peace in the
southern Thailand byaccommodating the interest
of bothsides, the Center and the South. The quest
for aneffective conflict settlement in the Southern
Thailand should also address the principal issues
that lie at the root ofconflict, such as the issues of
Pan-Thai policy and Patani’s public distrust; (4)
Indonesia should emphasizea national integration-
based settlement approach in dealing with the
South Thailand issue. Such an approach is a more
rational option rather than the Autonomy-for-the
South Peace optionsince it brings the localMalay
Muslims to theThai socio-culturalmainstream, so
that they are no longer perceiving ‘strangers’ in
their own native homeland; (5) Indonesia should
ensure that the national integration concept
adopted by the Thai government to address the
South Thailand issue should also integrate the Is-
lamic boarding schools’curriculuminto theaccred-
ited national educational system. The curriculum
compatibilitybetween the public schools and pri-
vate Islamic schools in Indonesia, including those
run by the PondokPesantren (Islamic boarding
school) circle, is an appropriate model to intro-
duce inSouthern Thailand.
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